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English Legal Thought, American Colonial Experience, and the Creation of the United States’ 
Constitution 
 




The United States’ Constitution is the fruit of centuries of legal thought and working 
institutions. In order to understand its jurisprudential underpinnings, one must go deeper than a 
cursory study of the summer of 1787 when it was drafted. First, a study of its essential principles 
must be traced back to their original sources, which requires a review of English Legal theory. 
Additionally, an understanding of the many trials and errors of early American constitutions is 
necessary to appreciate its ultimate incorporation of costly experience. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, in depth analysis of both Federalist and Anti-Federalist arguments proves invaluable 
to appreciating the truly unique and innovative aspects of the Federal Constitution.  Mixed and 
weighed properly, these ingredients combine to produce a solid foundation for understanding the 
origins of America’s Constitution.  
 
Relevant English Legal Theory 
The roots of American Constitutional law run deep through English legal history, even back to 
the Magna Carta of 1215.1 Among the leading contributing English legal scholars and 
                                                          
1 Russell Kirk, The Roots of American Order (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2003), 194-195. 
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philosophers are Sir Edward Coke (1552–1634), John Locke (1632–1704), and Sir William 
Blackstone (1723–1780). It is difficult to overstate the influence of any one of these thinkers on 
the development of U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence. The most recent of contributors is not 
always the most significant, as is the case with these three individuals. Of the three, Coke was 
the most influential in developing U.S. Constitutional theory. An analysis of these authors’ 
relative contributions, followed by a brief weighing of the said contributions will demonstrate 
Coke’s primary influence.  
Sir Edward Coke’s contributions are three in number: an early form of judicial review, a 
concept of a law fundamental and an insistence on legislative supremacy under the law. 
Constitutional Scholar Edward S. Corwin identifies the seed of U.S. judicial review in Coke’s 
decision in the Bonham Case of 1610. In it Coke asserted judicial power to declare an act of 
Parliament void. The relevant passage in Coke’s decision reads: “And it appears in our books, 
that in many cases, the common law will control acts of parliament and sometimes adjudge them 
to be utterly void.”2 Coke’s grounds for such authority was adherence to “common right and 
reason,” a familiar standard in U.S. legal practice.  This notion of “right reason” eventually 
became the higher law to which judges ought to appeal when judging an act of the legislature. 
Corwin explains: “‘Common right and reason’ is, in short, something fundamental, something 
permanent; it is higher law.”3 Thus, Coke introduced the idea that judges may void an act of the 
legislature based on common right and reason. It is important to note however that there cannot 
be a direct line drawn from this to U.S. judicial review, given that Coke had no concept of the 
separation of powers.  
                                                          
2 Edward S. Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 
2008), 41.  
3 Ibid, 44.  
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Rather than leave this higher law in the reasonableness standard, Coke equated higher 
law with the Magna Carta. Coke’s most significant contribution to U.S. legal theory is this move 
of positing higher law into a written document. The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law to 
which all judges are bound in their adjudications. This practice is begotten from Coke and the 
Magna Carta. Coke viewed the Magna Carta as the “fountain of all fundamental law,” held that 
“statutes against it ‘shall be void’” and that its “benefits extend to all.”4 With these 
characteristics, Coke showed that the Magna Carta embodied higher law and was a “law 
fundamental,” under which all common laws were to yield. Corwin summarizes this move: 
“Thus, the vague concept of common right and reason is replaced with a ‘law fundamental’ of 
definite content.”5 Understanding “law fundamental” as a document to which all common law is 
accountable is a key to understanding how the U.S. Constitution functions as the supreme law of 
the land.  
The last significant contribution of Coke’s to American Constitutional law is his notion 
of Parliament’s supremacy under the law. Far from asserting that Parliament is sovereign, which 
Blackstone claimed he did, Coke “generally regarded the cause of parliament and the law as 
identical.”6 Parliament was in no way above the law and legislation was to be subject to 
adjudication on the basis of the “law fundamental.”  
John Locke’s influences can likewise be narrowed to three: natural rights theory, 
limitations on the legislature, and property rights. In Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, he 
completely transformed the longstanding notion of natural law into a doctrine of natural rights. 
One definitive passage reads: “The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges 
                                                          
4 Ibid, 52.  
5 Ibid, 52.  
6 Ibid, 53.  
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everyone: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being 
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or 
possessions.”7 Hence, Locke transforms a concept of abstract natural law principles, which 
regulate the authority of government, to one in which individuals have particular rights that 
cannot justly be violated.  This shift is profound. Corwin observes, “Locke’s treatment of natural 
law is the almost complete dissolution which this concept undergoes through his handling into 
the natural rights of the individual.”8 Locke based this theory of natural rights on his popular 
social contract theory, which is equally significant in American constitutional theory. One can 
find Locke’s theory of natural rights influence most clearly in the preamble to the Declaration of 
Independence.9 Corwin also points to the social contract theory’s influence in the early colonial 
charters in Plymouth and elsewhere.10 Finally, the U.S. Constitution is likewise understood as a 
contract between the people and government. 
Regarding limitations on the legislature, Locke lays out four.11 Two limitations merit 
emphasis here. The first is that the legislature may not transfer any of its power to any other 
entities.12 We see this doctrine asserted vigorously in the United State’s Constitutional 
jurisprudence in order to maintain proper separation of powers. Second, the legislature is not the 
ultimate authority, but the people always reserve the right to restructure their government.13 This 
is affirmed in the preamble to the Constitution; which states that The People are the ultimate 
arbiters of power. Also influential was Locke’s theory of property rights; which provided 
                                                          
7 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London: Everyman, 1993), 117.  
8 Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 58. 
9 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers (New York: Signet Classics, 2003), 528.  
10 Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 61. 
11 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 188. 
12 Ibid, 187. 
13 Ibid, 183.  
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philosophical justification for the numerous protections in the Constitution for private property, 
such as the Fifth Amendment.  
Sir William Blackstone’s additions are found in his means for legal interpretation and his 
doctrine of legislative sovereignty. Blackstone’s primary input to American Constitutional theory 
is his method of constitutional interpretation. During the formative years of the republic, 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England “tended to preserve the legacy of English 
law in America” through its widespread influence on America’s young legal community.14 In 
this monumental work, he argued that the best way to find the intent or meaning of a law is “by 
signs most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject 
matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of the law.”15 These five methods of 
interpretation remain the predominate means for judges to discern the meaning of any law. 
Through this scheme of interpretation, Blackstone has indirectly shaped the U.S. Constitution via 
the numerous Supreme Court decisions and justices that they have affected it. 16 
The second and certainly more subtle way that Blackstone influenced the U.S. 
Constitution is through the doctrine of legislative sovereignty.17  Blackstone argued that there 
must be a sovereign body and that the legislature was naturally it. Through this elevating of the 
legislature, Corwin argues that Blackstone added legislative sovereignty to “the stock of 
American political ideas.” However, Corwin is quick to point out that legislative sovereignty did 
not stick institutionally in the United States because the written constitution made it possible to 
have a statute emanating from the sovereign people, which was the supreme law.18   
                                                          
14 Kirk, The Roots of American Order, 370.  
15 James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000), 466.  
16 Kirk, The Roots of American Order, 374. 
17 A. London Fell, Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the Legislative State: Volume Six, Book 1 (WestPort: 
Praeger Publishers, 2004), 258.  
18 Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law, 84.  
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Of these three English contributors, Coke is the most essential for understanding U.S. 
Constitutional theory because of his notion of law fundamental. His equating higher law with a 
written document and demanding that judges adhere to it in deciding cases is of the utmost 
importance. While Locke clearly influenced the Declaration of Independance and Constitution, 
he did not emphasize the written constitution the way Coke did. Also, Blackstone’s method of 
interpretation, while significant, is dependent upon Coke’s law fundamental.  
 
Trials and Errors of Early American Constitutions 
The Articles of Confederation were designed to be weak and functioned more as a treaty 
than a fundamental law; and nearly all of the early state constitutions were written in haste by 
inexperienced individuals. Each of these failed attempts served as invaluable practice in creating 
a constitution capable of maintain order. As Alexis de Tocqueville instructed in his examination 
of state constitutions: “The mighty political principles which govern present-day American 
society undoubtedly began and developed in the state. Thus close scrutiny of the state holds the 
key to the rest.”19 Constitutional Scholar James McClellan correctly characterizes the three 
general problems of these early attempts at a constitution as: failure to create a proper separation 
of powers, lack of an independent executive, and absence of a supremacy clause.20  
The Articles of Confederation provide the most blatant example of the failure to 
institutionalize a proper separation of powers. This document instituted no executive or judicial 
branch (see article v.). 21  All of its functions were performed by one legislative body.22  States 
jealously guarded their sovereignty against this new contract and concluded that the government 
                                                          
19 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 72.  
20 James McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2000), 149. 
21 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 534. 
22 McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice, 159. 
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structured by the Articles would have such little authority that a separation of powers was not 
necessary. This mistake was made in most state constitutions as well, but for different reasons. 
Almost without exception, the state constitutions instituted an inadequate separation of powers.23 
McClellan explains this inadequacy as a misunderstanding of checks and balances. While state 
governments had three distinct branches, they had no checks and balances between these 
branches.24 This left each branch without means of protecting itself, often allowing the 
legislature to encroach on the other branches; the notable exception to this rule being the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, written by John Adams.25 
Related to the lack of separation of powers was the failure of these early constitutions to 
create an independent executive. This clear deficiency in the Articles of Confederation was 
assailed by Alexander Hamilton who argued in Federalist 71 that the executive “should be in a 
situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor and decision.”26 Since the Articles set up no 
distinct branches, the executive authority was exercised by committees within the legislature.27 
Thus, the executive power was in no ways independent, which led to conflicting jurisdictions and 
an inability to enforce laws due to lack of personnel. Similarly defective, the Pennsylvania 
Constitution contained a plural executive consisting of thirteen members. This made any uniform 
action nigh impossible.28 Also, this plural executive was chosen by the legislature, which made 
the executive beholden to it. Most of the state constitutions also fell into this trap and had their 
executives appointed by the legislature, leaving them dependent and ineffective.29 
                                                          
23 John Adams, The Political Writings of John Adams (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003), 143. 
24 McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice, 149. 
25 Adams, The Political Writings of John Adams, 93.  
26 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 431.  
27 McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice, 159. 
28 Ibid, 147.  
29 Adams, The Political Writings of John Adams, 143. 
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Finally, the lack of a supremacy clause abandoned most state constitutions to be ignored 
by the courts. This was perhaps the fatal flaw of the Articles of Confederation.30 It allowed state 
judges to favor their state legislatures over the Articles, which they did readily. With similar 
consequences, all of the early state constitutions also neglected to add a supremacy clause. The 
acts of the legislatures could not be struck down, leading to ever-expanding legislative authority.  
One additional defect of the Articles of Confederation was its inability to tax and pay for 
its own operations. However, it was ultimately the improper separation of powers, a dependent 
executive, and the lack of a supremacy clause that were the primary problems of these early 
attempts at a constitution. Largely through the influence of John Adams’ colossal work A 
Defense of American Constitution, these problems were realized and remedied in The 
Constitution of The United States. 31 
 
Federalist and Anti-Federalist Debate 
Perhaps nothing was as influential on The Constitution as the Federalist debates over 
ratification. It was this debate and the pointed arguments of the Anti-Federalists that eventually 
led to the adoption of a Bill of Rights. Given that the Anti-Federalist case is typically 
overshadowed by The Federalist’s arguments, it is necessary to review their case here to reveal 
their influence on The Constitution. To assess the strength of the Anti-Federalist case, each of its 
primary arguments must be weighed against the counter-arguments of the Federalists. The chief 
arguments of the Anti-Federalists can be summarized as follows: the illegality of the 
Constitution, its insufficiency to govern a large area, its creation of an uncontrollable empire, the 
overly-powerful three branches, and its lack of a Bill of Rights.  
                                                          
30 McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice, 159. 
31 Kirk, The Roots of American Order, 417.    
50





Perhaps the most persuasive argument of the Anti-Federalist case was that the 
Constitution is illegal.32 In The Address and Reasons for Dissent, two evidences are given for 
this argument. First, state delegates to the Constitutional Convention were sent merely “for the 
purposes of revising and amending the present Articles of Confederation.”33 Secondly, the 
delegates were strictly bound by their state constitutions to refrain from any actions that 
“lessened or abridged rights and privileges” retained by their state constitutions.34 They clearly 
went beyond their legally delegated authority in both of these respects. The only response to this 
charge comes from James Madison in Federalist 40, where he denied the accusation of illegality 
and asserts that substantial change is in the country’s best interest.35 If it is true that liberty 
depends on the rule of law, this constitution was on shaky ground. The Anti-Federalist argument 
was sound and perhaps should have won them the debate.  
Their case in its entirety was not so persuasive. The Anti-Federalists argued that the large 
population and number of diverse interests among the states would make a federal government 
inevitably despotic. This was a leading argument in The Address and Reasons for Dissent.36 
Madison provides the conclusive counterargument in Federalist 10: “Extend the sphere [of a 
republic], and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that 
a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if 
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own 
strength or act in unison with each other.”37 Thus, Madison shows that a larger republic will 
make it less susceptible to despotism. This Anti-Federalist argument fails.   
                                                          
32 Pennsylvania Minority, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (New York: 
Signet Classics, 2003), 244. 
33 Pennsylvania Minority, The Anti-Federalist Papers, 244. 
34 McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice, 432. 
35 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 249. 
36 Pennsylvania Minority, The Anti-Federalist Papers, 249. 
37 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 78. 
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Emphasized the most by the Anti-Federalists was the argument that the sheer amount of 
power delegated to the federal government would create an uncontrollable empire, or so argued 
Patrick Henry.38 The Federalists responded that the delegated power was divided, not only 
between the states and the national government, but also within the national government itself.39 
However, the Anti-Federalists countered that such internal divisions created a “dangerous 
mixture of the powers of government;” in that each branch exercised some portion of the powers 
of the other branches.40 For example, the Senate is needed to create foreign treaties, thereby 
making the executive partially dependent upon the legislative branch. However, Madison shows 
in Federalist 47 that this blending of powers is needed for the efficacy of proper checks and 
balances between each branch.41 In addition, Madison writes in Federalist 45 that the powers of 
the national government are “few and defined,” while the powers of the state governments are 
“numerous and indefinite.”42 Again, the Anti-Federalist argument falls under the weight of the 
Federalists’ responses.  
The next series of arguments from the Anti-Federalists are specific to the three branches 
of government created by the Constitution. With regard to the legislative branch, an Anti-
Federalist writer, with the penname “Brutus”, argued that the taxing power of Congress was 
dangerous because its amount and purposes are undefined.43 Alexander Hamilton responds in 
Federalist 34 that it would be unwise to specify a particular amount for taxation given the 
probability of war and national emergencies.44 Madison also responds in Federalist 41 that the 
                                                          
38 Patrick Henry, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (New York: Signet 
Classics, 2003), 210. 
39 McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice, 394. 
40 Pennsylvania Minority, The Anti-Federalist Papers, 259. 
41 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 299. 
42 Ibid, 289.   
43  Brutus, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates (New York: Signet Classics, 
2003), 295. 
44 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 203. 
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purposes for taxation are not indefinite, but limited to carrying out the enumerated powers of 
congress.45 In addition to attacking the taxing power of Congress, Brutus criticized “the 
necessary and proper” clause as a comprehensive power that would be able to overwhelm state 
legislatures.46 Hamilton counters in Federalist 33 that this clause was simply a nod to reality, 
only meant to make sure that Congress could not be subverted or incapable of carrying out its 
legal functions.47 
The arguments of the Anti-Federalists against the Executive and Judicial branches are 
their weakest. “Cato” claimed that the executive was a functional Monarch.48 However, 
Hamilton showed in Federalists 69 that this charge was baseless, describing the numerous and 
significant differences between the two. One difference being that the president is elected and 
serves for a limited term – a Monarch is hereditary and indefinite.49 In opposition to the 
judiciary, the Anti-Federalists claimed that the national courts’ ability to judge cases based on 
equity gave them too much indiscriminate power that would overwhelm the states.50 Hamilton 
retorts in Federalist 78 that the judiciary is no threat because it has no power over the “sword or 
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society.”51 Thus, the Anti-
Federalists charges against each of the three branches are halted.  
The crowning achievement of the Anti-Federalists was the Bill of Rights. Drafts of which 
rights ought to be enumerated therein were offered up by various state conventions.52 Initially, 
all states blocked a motion to add a bill of rights to the constitution.53 The Federalists had 
                                                          
45 Ibid, 258.  
46 Brutus, The Anti-Federalist Papers, 284. 
47 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 199.  
48 Cato, The Anti-Federalist Papers, 337. 
49 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 420. 
50 Brutus, The Anti-Federalist Papers, 312. 
51 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 464. 
52 Ralph Ketcham, The Anti-Federalist Papers, 220. 
53 McClellan, Liberty, Order, and Justice, 401. 
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persuasively argued that it was unnecessary. In addition, Hamilton adds five reasons in 
Federalist 84 explaining why such enumeration would be harmful. Among them was the 
argument that the constitution already contained specific liberties maintained by the people.54 
Although the Bill of Rights did find its way into the Constitution, the Federalists sufficiently 
dispelled the Anti-Federalists’ argument that it was necessary.  
The Anti-Federalists claim that the constitution was illegal was true and perhaps should 
have been heeded. However, as to the substance of the constitution, The Anti-Federalists’ case 
was not strong enough to overcome the explanation and argumentation of the Federalists. They 
failed to prove that one government could not properly rule such a large area, show that the 
powers delegated to the national government would lead to despotism, disparage the three 
branches, and demonstrate the necessity of a Bill of Rights.  
 
Conclusion 
The structure and principles of the Constitution were the culmination of legal thinking 
that developed over several centuries. This unique document was not born out of the untried, 
abstract ideas of fifty-five isolated lawyers, but grew out of a rich tradition of trial and error. The 
early idea of a governing constitution, to which the people and the courts are accountable and on 
which the people could depend for justice is owed to the legal genius of Sir Edward Coke. By 
treating the Magna Carta as such a governing document, in many ways, he created the blueprint 
for our constitutional society today. John Locke’s philosophical groundwork for natural rights 
added the impetus for individual rights and privileges which are included in this governing 
document. However, with a governing document in place, it remains a challenge to interpret and 
                                                          
54 U.S. Congress, The Federalist Papers, 514. 
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apply the legal statutes within that document to a developing society. Blackstone filled this 
critical void with his rules for legal interpretation.  
Although these legal principles inherited from English minds were vital, they remained 
abstract and could not simply be grafted onto young America. Creating a government that fits the 
particular manners and mores of a people takes skill and nuance and the only way to develop 
these is experience. The early American Constitutions provided this experience of drawing on 
the abstract legal principles to construct a constitution for a particular society. In addition, the 
debates of the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists served the crucial role of balancing the diverse 
interests among the many states. Each party served to moderate the other, leaving the nation with 
a strong national government that nonetheless reserved most rights to the states and restrained its 
own power.   
Societies will not typically respect ad hoc decrees and arbitrary institutions. It is passage 
through the trial of time and experience that its respect is earned. Understanding this rich 
tradition underlying the advent of the American Constitution reveals that it is anything but an 
insulated achievement; it incorporates western legal thought and experience that has been refined 
throughout many centuries. This progression from the Magna Carta to today has been the U.S. 
Constitutions trial and it remains the oldest standing Constitution in the modern world.  
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